“Charles Arthur Campbell's (1897-1974) inaugural address at Glasgow University in 1938, In Defence of Free Will, attempted to restore sensible discussion to a problem he regarded as unparalleled in the history of metaphysics.”
(
From The Information Philosopher )
C A Campbell was deeply concerned with "logical positivism" and its attendant claims which are summarized by the term “verifiability criterion of meaning”. This philosophy sought to impose a rule on all language by which any statement was made either valid or invalid according to its criteria. This “validation” of language according to strict rules of empiricism reduced most (if not all) theological statements to meaningless terms or nonsense (at least in the minds of those who espoused it!). This philosophy which attempted to reduce all knowledge to sensory experience, gained credibility among philosophers and enjoyed quite a following until it was pointed out that the rule itself could not be proved scientifically or logically according to empiricism. Campbell's concern was not just with the rendering of all language of God meaningless, but that the very nature of human morality and the infrastructure of human relations were at stake. The impact of logical positivism on culture is
still evident today by the impact that various forms of determinism have tended to dehumanize, and minimize human autonomy.
Any threat to freedom is thus a threat to moral responsibility
“Let us begin by noting that the problem of free will gets its urgency for the ordinary educated man by reason of its close connection with the conception of moral responsibility. When we regard a man as morally responsible for an act, we regard him as a legitimate object of moral praise or blame in respect of it. But it seems plain that a man cannot be a legitimate object of moral praise or blame for an act unless in willing the act he is in some important sense a 'free' agent. Evidently free will in some sense, therefore, is a pre-condition of moral responsibility. Without doubt it is the realization that any threat to freedom is thus a threat to moral responsibility — with all that that implies — combined with the knowledge that there are a variety of considerations, philosophic, scientific, and theological, tending to place freedom in jeopardy, that gives to the problem of free will its perennial and universal appeal. And it is therefore in close connection with the question of the conditions of moral responsibility that any discussion of the problem must proceed, if it is not to be academic in the worst sense of the term.
Although Campbell formed his arguments to counter the danger of reducing humankind towards a scale of mere animality and amoral being- something to which all Christians should be in agreement against- his analysis is useful for our intended purpose- that is, to show that even those of diminished responsibility are nonetheless accountable. We should appreciate the care Campbell takes in his use of language. Note that he says:
When we regard a man as morally responsible for an act, we regard him
as a legitimate object of moral praise or blame in respect of it. But
it seems plain that a man cannot be a legitimate object of moral praise
or blame for an act unless in willing the act he is in some important
sense a 'free' agent. (My emphasis)
We note Campbell does not imply here, human freedom in an absolute or ultimate sense. But merely that human freedom must have
some basis in reality in order for the sense of culpability to survive or keep traction with reality. After all, we recognize that an insane person is not responsible for his actions according to the degree they are
not free to make responsible decisions. Nevertheless is it not at least posssible that his own decisions as a free person has resulted in his insanity? He continues:
We raise the question at once, therefore, what are the conditions, in respect of freedom, which must attach to an act in order to make it a morally responsible act? It seems to me that the fundamental conditions are two. I shall state them with all possible brevity, for we have a long road to travel.
The first condition is the universally recognized one that the act must be self-caused, self-determined. But it is important to accept this condition in its full rigor. The agent must be not merely [be] a cause but the sole cause of that for which he is deemed morally responsible. If entities other than the self have also a causal influence upon an act, then that act is not one for which we can say without qualification that the self is morally responsible. If in respect of it we hold the self responsible at all, it can only be for some feature of the act — assuming the possibility of disengaging such a feature — of which the self is the sole cause. I do not see how this conclusion can be evaded. But it has awkward implications which have led not a few people to abandon the notion of individual moral responsibility altogether.
Here he appears to be in opposition to forms of determinism though not necessarily that of the theological kind.
This first condition, however, is quite clearly not sufficient. It is possible to conceive an act of which the agent is the sole cause, but which is at the same time an act necessitated by the agent's nature.
So if, as a result of a purely voluntary act, the nature of that person has suffered loss or change and is no longer able to act purely voluntarily but now acts out of necessity in accordance with that irremediable change in nature, the moral law still stands. Anyone can see that one is
no longer free to use a chainsaw according to "standard best practice", that is,
with both hands if, in the free act of using a chainsaw, he has sawn off one of them! But that does nothing to change the reality that "standard best practice" remains the right way to use a chainsaw. It seems that here we must pilot the ship carefully- for if we so diminish this sense of human freedom that we totally undermine the idea of existing in a moral Universe, we run aground on the rocks of pure determinism, there is no longer a moral case to answer. On the other hand if we steer the ship so much towards absolute human freedom, we not only undermine the case for a moral Universe, we destroy the absolute freedom of God. God himself along with all humanity becomes shipwreck! D. A. Carson in his book
"How Long Oh Lord" reflects on this problem in Chapter 2 False Steps, under the head "God Has Made Humans Totally Free":
But the most common self-imposed divine limitation [according to this view] has to do with human freedom, and is worth separate consideration. I hasten to say that with some expressions of the "free-will defense" (FWD) I have no quarrel, and I shall draw the necessary distinctions later in this book. But as popularly presented, the FWD assumes that for humans beings to be held morally accountable before God , they must be absolutely free: that is, their choices must be entirely free from divine constraint or necessity. At such points God is absolutely contingent: in other words, he is not in control, but is merely responding to the situation. If he were in control, it is argued, then human beings would not be "free", and therefore not morally responsible.
We shall shortly see that this view simply does not do justice to the language of scripture. That does not mean there is no "free-will" in any sense; but free will must not be defined in such a fashion as to make God contingent.
Campbell continues that moral responsibility is completely dependent on the idea that- at least at some point in time- there must have existed the reality of human freedom to justify moral law:
But underlying that judgment is always the assumption that the person has come to be what he now is in virtue of past acts of will in which he was confronted by real alternatives, by genuinely open possibilities: and, strictly speaking, it is in respect of these past acts of his that we praise or blame the agent now. ”
Before I go further let’s explore a little of “moral responsibility”. If one accepts ojective morality as a universal fact of our world, such as that proposed by Divine Command Theory
(see here) then a certain act, say bigamy, is wrong irrespective of a moral agent’s belief and understanding of it. Accordingly, if it is practiced as a religious right or privilege and even if it is not only condoned, but encouraged in that culture so that no feelings of guilt are experienced or even thought of- it was, is and always shall be- still wrong. Indeed, awareness of its “wrongness” is not a prerequisite of it actually being wrong or being guilty of that wrong.
· Ignorance then is not a defense of transgression.
Even if, in a court of Law, where the DCT (Divine Command Theory) was honored and practiced it might attract a more lenient sentence because of the mitigating circumstances of ignorance, still it will not change the unalterable objective reality of it being wrong.
Campbell raises the issue of “free will” as the necessary corollary of moral accountability, ie that if one is not free then neither is he responsible. Those who accept an objective morality generally assume this libertarian view of free will. But then he goes further and raises this idea:
“It is possible to conceive an act of which the agent is the sole cause, but which is at the same time an act necessitated by the agent's nature.”
Now, for example what if one endowed with this widely accepted characteristic of libertarian free will were to fall prey to a particularly malicious drug, say methamphetamine. She became so vitiated by the effect of this addictive drug that her previously quiet and co-operative nature changed completely to a violent, self-willed explosive temperament. Upon her first ingestion of the drug she was completely aware of what she was doing and in control of all her faculties, this was her own decision. And now in the violent control of this debilitating drug she lies, cheats and steals her way through life. She finally even resorts to murder to support her all consuming habit.
Campbell:
“It is perfectly true that we do sometimes hold a person morally responsible for an act, even when we believe that [s]he, being what [s]he now is, virtually could not do otherwise.”
· The lack of a perfectly free will (libertarian free will) is not a defense of transgression.
Campbell has given the justification for prosecution perhaps even to “the full extent of the law” when he stated:
“But underlying that judgment is always the assumption that the person has come to be what he now is in virtue of past acts of will in which he was confronted by real alternatives, by genuinely open possibilities: and, strictly speaking, it is in respect of these past acts of his that we praise or blame the agent now.”
The Law Courts deal with this reality everyday- people of demonstrably diminished responsibility are still sentenced on the basis of moral accountability, that is- of being moral agents having free will. Arguably, of late the sentences are perhaps lighter because of this but that is here not our concern. The truth remains that at some point these people were as morally free agents as anybody else but through a series of their own acts and decisions they are now in a state of diminished responsibility. Nevertheless these people are the subject of unalterable moral law even though they no longer are able to be responsible. I want to make quite clear that the sense in which I use the word “responsible” is as follows: “One who is able to respond as required by moral dictums”
In this whole scenario I propose that we have- by way of analogy- a very similar circumstance that took place in a garden a long time ago…
The very first humans that showed all the hallmarks of person-hood- moral accountability and by implication- free will- were Adam and Eve. We know they were morally “response-able” because of the general understanding that only moral agents are capable of obedience to a moral imperative- an “ought”. Would God have asked them not to eat of that tree if they weren't able to obey, or to put another way- would not God's imperative have been rendered meaningless if human responsibility and freedom were not true in some sense?
Because of our (human-kinds) present state both morally and for many spiritually we tend to miss the incredible implications of that fateful moment. Consider: If it is true that God merely spoke and all of creation came into being
ex nihilo, out of nothing- observe the majesty and power of his Word, ponder this for a moment. Ponder the immensity of our universe, the complexity of a single cell…It all came to be by a Word from God.
And now think about the words:
”What is man that you are mindful of him, the son of man that you care for him?" Or “what are mere mortals that you should think about them, human beings that you should care for them?”
How is it that God spoke again and that same unimaginably powerful Word ran off the progenitors of the human race like water off a ducks back? What fearful contrariety is this? That the entire universe obeyed and yet a mere speck of vivified stardust refused God in that Garden. What fearful freedom! What fearful consequences…
And what are the implications of that moment in time?
God said: “that the day you eat thereof you shall surely die”.
Now it is evident that Adam and Eve did not immediately die in the physical sense, so in what sense did they die? When people die in a physical sense what change takes place? The most immediate and noticeable effect is the “lack of consciousness”. It is generally accepted that this “death” is explicable in terms of a lack of consciousness to the reality of God and by implication therefore lack the ability to satisfy any demands that he places upon them.
So now we have two people who owe everything to God but are now oblivious to his presence and do not have an immediate sense of moral accountability to Him. Shortly after their transgression God asked: "Where are you?" and there was no reply. The question was not a result of God losing track of his creatures but rather a question designed to demonstrate how their state of being had changed. "Adam, where are you?" What state have you gotten yourself into? Their inner being, their nature had changed such that
God was now out of their reach, not that they were out of God's reach. The following verse exemplifies this death and its cause but also a reference to the author who had initiated new life:
"And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins;" Ephesians 2:1(my emphasis)
It was the celebrated Christian author, media critic and commentator on contemporary history Malcolm Muggeridge who said:
"The depravity of man is at once the most empirically verifiable reality but at the same time the most intellectually resisted fact."
No doubt that intellectual resistance is all part of that depravity.
What exactly is meant by the total depravity of man?
“Total depravity is the fallen state of human beings as a result of original sin. The doctrine of total depravity asserts that people are by nature not inclined or even able to love God wholly with heart, mind, and strength, but rather all are inclined by nature to serve their own will and desires and to reject the rule of God. Even religion and philanthropy are wicked to God to the extent that these originate from a human imagination, passion, and will, and are not done to the glory of God. Therefore… if God is to save anyone God must predestine, call, or elect individuals to salvation since fallen man does not want to, and is indeed incapable of choosing God.
Total depravity does not mean, however, that people are as evil as possible. Rather, it means that even the good which a person may intend is faulty in its premise, false in its motive, and weak in its implementation; and there is no mere refinement of natural capacities that can correct this condition. Thus, even acts of generosity and altruism are in fact egoist acts in disguise. All good, consequently, is derived from God alone, and in no way through humanity.
This idea can be illustrated by a glass of wine with a few drops of deadly poison in it: Although not all the liquid is poison, all the liquid is poisoned. In the same way, while not all of human nature is depraved, all human nature is totally affected by depravity.” (Emphasis mine, from Wikipedia)
I hope the analogy is now obvious when one considers the impossibility of the addict to respond to the demands of moral law and yet their inability to obey (which resulted from their own action) is not excusable nor does it negate the demands of the law. This is exactly what happened in that garden, and the changes
in human nature as a result of the fall are from mankind’s perspective irrevocable,(."..
The things which are impossible with men are possible with God" Luke 18:27) Mankind, represented by our progenitors, Adam and Eve, were
originally able to respond properly to God and the demands of moral law, but
are now incapable, and yet the demands of the moral law are not withdrawn, it is irrevocable since they are the proper and just requirements of moral beings.
“Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God.” Romans 8:7
Total depravity means every area of person-hood has been affected by this fall and no more so than this fall from a free will in the sense that is commonly and erroneously assumed- and this is the universal portion of humankind since that time. From that time forth what humankind chose freely was to sin because of this inherited sin nature, he has thus chosen freely to be a slave to sin. Whoever sins is a slave of sin. Whoever then chooses Christ freely has chosen against that sin nature. But then, you may well ask: How is it possible to choose something contrary to one's nature? Can a camel choose not to wear its hump, or a leopard its spots? It is only when the inherited sin-nature is comprehended in all its inglorious depth that we begin to truly appreciate the grace that made the blind to see and the dead to rise up. We begin to appreciate why the "Son of Man" was also called the "Second Adam" just like the first Adam in the sense of being the progenitor of the human race, the Second Adam is the progenitor an entirely new people, an Holy Nation a people belonging to God.
"For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of death." Romans 8:2
It is precisely for the reasons mentioned above that we reject (since the fall) the idea of absolute human autonomy (libertarian free will) and yet still believe in humankind's culpability and responsibility- that has not changed. When Christ saves- he alone must take the initiative and he alone must get the credit. And hence the "Solo Christo" of the Reformation. Through Christ Alone.
