Peter Boghossian On Faith- A Critique

There is a known principle in philosophy that one might call “the principle of charitable representation”. What this entails is that when critiquing a view that one believes is mistaken, or erroneous, one ought- as a sign of integrity- first define the view that is opposed, in a way that fairly represents the argument, and, as a mark of goodwill, present it in its best possible light.

But wait, perhaps I’m jumping ahead of myself. If we ask the question: What does philosophic inquiry look like? Then what follows are some rudiments of formal inquiry employed in the pursuit of philosophy. Following some of the fundamentals, we will look at an example of a philosopher presenting his arguments for the view he holds. And then we will critique that view in turn.

An argument, in the sense used above, isn’t about bickering, or verbal abuse, it’s about rational thinking that comprises a premise, or premises, and a process of logical reasoning from which a conclusion follows and is established. The process, may be thought of as a house, the roof of which- is the final assertion, the logical conclusion of an argument. If an assertion, or a claim to truth is not supported by reasoned arguments, then it is like a roof without walls. The arguments then, are those reasons by which the conclusion is supported. The arguments are the reasons that hold up the conclusion, the thing claimed to be true. A bare assertion without supporting arguments is a house roof that will shelter nobody because it has no walls. If the conclusion has strong supporting arguments, the roof will hold up to repeated challenges to its integrity. If the argument is supported weakly, then the possibility is that- as the walls cave in to pressure- then the whole roof collapses to the ground. Needless to say- do not seek shelter under that sort of roof.

The above argument is logically valid. That is, if the premises P1 and P2 are true, then the conclusion C is guaranteed true. So, in the argument the basis on which it depends are twofold. It may fail only if one or both premises are untrue. And it may fail if the logic is not valid. In this case the logic is valid and therefore the soundness or not of the argument is reliant only on the premises. On the face of it a major in business studies would do well to include logic and so there is reason to question premise 1, it may in fact be untrue.

Logical arguments sometimes employ deductive reasoning and sometimes, it’s a matter of induction. Deductive arguments are considered valid, and- providing the premises meet the standard of truth- it guarantees the truth of the conclusion.

“If a valid argument has true premises, then the argument is said to be sound.”

In this case, if there is general agreement with the premise, then there can be no argument with the conclusion.

“if the premises are true, then it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false.”

However, consider this, a conclusion that follows a deductive argument, if developed from false premises, is still said to be valid but is not true. The logic of the deduction is not false, but the premise is, and therefore the result, or its conclusion, is false.

“Either Elizabeth owns a Honda or she owns a Saturn.

Elizabeth does not own a Honda.

Therefore, Elizabeth owns a Saturn.

It is important to stress that the premises of an argument do not have actually to be true in order for the argument to be valid.” (words in bold from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy )

However inductive arguments are those in which inferences are made. Inferences are those arguments in which either an argument is more likely, or less likely to be true, according to its premises and how well informed are its arguments.

“In an inductive argument, the premises are intended only to be so strong that, if they were true, then it would be unlikely that the conclusion is false. There is no standard term for a successful inductive argument. But its success or strength is a matter of degree, unlike with deductive arguments. A deductive argument is valid or else invalid.” (words in bold from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy )

Another sign of integrity in logical argument is that in order to show this attitude of charity, the better party will not try to make out that their argument is always a deductive one- if there is any doubt as to this. According to the rule of charity, the idea is that the interlocutor should only claim deductive certainty when it is incontrovertible. So with this principle in mind, many will state things like: “In all fairness it seems that…” or “given that...it is appropriate to reckon” or “we ought to account for this therefore by…”.

In the following YouTube video entitled “Is Science the Only Source of Absolute Truth?” by Christian thinker, philosopher Mitch Stokes, he demonstrates the charitable principle by the use of understatement in his critique of the claim “that science is the only source of absolute truth”. We may contrast this with the over exuberance of skeptic philosopher Bertrand Russell who made this absolute claim of science:

“I conclude that, while it is true that science cannot decide questions of values, that is because they cannot be intellectually decided at all, and lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood. Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know.”

Defining terms is, in formal and informal refutations, a fundamental step, one that ensures that everyone involved is clear as to what the argument is about, and ensures that people don’t talk past each other. It is the effort to minimize unnecessary misunderstanding at the outset. By avoiding equivocation, whether an opponent purposely misleads with ambiguous language or whether it happens by accident, its practice in the long run saves time and energy. The opponent states the opposing argument in her own words, to show that they have not misunderstood the argument, and that discourse is then possible. Just as polite conversation is guaranteed by rules of social etiquette- such as don’t interrupt while the other is speaking- so too, do the rules of engagement guarantee more satisfactory dialogue. There ought- in the name of consistency- to be at least some attempt to standardize terms.

My pre-teen son was having a conversation with an Irish boy who didn’t understand his Kinglish, (Kiwi/English) very well. With a puzzled look, he asked his mother, “Mum, what's a ‘cave’?”. To which his mother replied, “You know- a kev” Instantly the two boys could continue the discussion on equal terms, because each understood what the other was saying. So defining terms is important to clear away misunderstandings that would cloud the real issues of difference. Defining terms is crucial, it makes a dialectical discourse possible.

Many will be cognizant of “the straw-man argument”, where an opponent uses a poor representation of an opposing argument to make it easy to demolish or refute it. Obviously the straw-man argument is an unfair, unreasonable tactic, and disingenuous for anyone to employ it, because the idea that is being “demolished” is not a true representation of the opposing view.

Many arguments are won on the basis of rhetoric rather than reason. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion that makes no scruples about its tactics. It is free to use hyperbole, emotive language, and leverages upon the prejudices and foibles of human nature. Style, psychology and presentation are as important to rhetoric, as rationality, logic, coherence and correspondence are to reason.

It has become common for people to appeal to pseudo-straw arguments, an attempt to make the opposing argument weak, and foolish at the same time. For example, the case that an argument for the existence of God is synonymous to an argument for the existence of a “flying spaghetti monster” is really a more covert appeal to a straw man argument with little more subtlety than a sledge hammer. And as Professor John Lennox pointed out, Richard Dawkins did not write a 400 page book attempting to refute belief in Wotan, or Zeus, nor does anyone know too many people who came to believe in Santa Claus as an adult. The interlocutor that uses this language is trying to persuade others by ingratiating herself into the favour of her sympathisers, by appealing to their prejudices, with the sentiments of many who deride and mock the beliefs of theists. It is an emotive tactic employing sarcasm, that is enticing favour by ridicule and mockery, in treating the theist as an idiot by association.

But in the case of “the principle of charitable representation”, the idea goes beyond what it means to refrain from using the “straw-man” argument. In fact it requires of the opponent, to fulfil an obligation to honesty and integrity, such that they make the best case possible on the behalf of that which she is opposing- and then to refute that “best possible case” with all the energy and logical discourse she is capable of. When people do this with integrity, then no-one can be accused of not doing an honest job of their refutation. It relies on what one may call the etiquette of philosophic best practice, so that they- at least at the beginning- attempt walking a mile while wearing the shoes of the opposition, or putting themselves in the others place. This shows a commitment to honesty and integrity that cannot be gainsaid.

Now, having laid the groundwork for an honest, and clearly defined way of proceeding with a dialectical discussion, we turn to the subject at hand.

Peter Boghossian, is an eloquent and outspoken speaker, “an American philosophy instructor, social activist, author, speaker, and atheism advocate”. Boghossian is “Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Portland State University. His primary research areas are critical thinking, philosophy of education, and moral reasoning.” (Wikipedia)

In a presentation entitled “Jesus, The Easter Bunny and Other Delusions: Just Say No!” which may be seen on YouTube, he presents an argument claiming, quote- “My thesis tonight is simple, and should be uncontroversial, faith-based belief processes are unreliable- and will not lead one to the truth” unquote. With a view of charity in mind, let us ignore for the moment his betrayal of the etiquette we might expect in a philosopher who is paid to give students an appreciation for good philosophy, that is evident even in the title of his discourse. He is after all, in this instance, largely preaching to the choir- it is an address to skeptics.

Aside from some preliminary statements that help define the terms of his thesis, he begins by outlining some poor ways of reasoning that people have employed in attempts at gaining knowledge of certain things. He highlights some uncontroversial, reliable conclusions about unreliable methods of reasoning such as astrology, homeopathy and dowsing. The evidence he quotes is from an appeal to the authority of the Mayo clinic, who conducted trials in the effectiveness of homeopathy. In another example he appeals to the authority of one Shawn Carlson’s “A Double-blind Test of Astrology”, published in the journal Nature, in 1985. These and other examples he uses to make his first major point:

“Unreliable processes, lead to unreliable conclusions, that is if the process one uses is unreliable the conclusions one comes to cannot be relied upon, cannot... ”

So far, none of this is remarkable or contested, and may pass without further comment.

Drawing an analogy to exploring the necessary steps that may be taken to find the dimensions of his missing bathroom door, Boghossian demonstrates some unreliable, even foolish efforts. Asking his dog being one of them.

He mentions one of the genuine possibilities may entail asking an expert. This appeal to authority is, in his own terms, of genuine epistemic value for the purposes of inquiry. Some people, in a mistaken understanding of the “appeal to authority fallacy” make the claim that any appeal to authority is out of court. That isn’t so. And as has been pointed out by C.S. Lewis- “A man who jibbed at authority in other things- as some people do in religion- would have to be content to know nothing all his life." For those that weren’t brought up in the days of horses and horse carriages, the word “jibbed” means to stop and refuse to go on. In Lewis’s view therefore, if we took the mistaken notion that authorities are not to be referred to, then science would cease to advance knowledge, philosophy would come to a standstill. It would also render senseless, Boghossian’s claim to the twin epistemic goals that we will look at next.

As an example of the value of referring to authorities, we ought to acknowledge that every person that ever made a significant contribution to knowledge in any field, in all humility stands on the shoulders of those that went before them. So, for instance, we have Newton who gave us a better understanding of gravity. Working from Newton's position, Einstein moved us from Newtonian physics to relativity. From Einsteinian relativity we graduated, or rather some scientists, (Stephen Hawking, Leonard Mlodinow) have graduated to quantum mechanics. But then we ought also to know that at this cutting edge of scientific knowledge not everything is yet settled. Roger Penrose is just one such scientist who has worked with perhaps the world's best known scientist, Stephen Hawkings.

“the universe has a purpose," Roger Penrose

Sir Roger Penrose calls string theory a "fashion," quantum mechanics "faith," and cosmic inflation a "fantasy." Coming from an armchair theorist, these declarations might be dismissed. But Penrose is a well-respected physicist who co-authored a seminal paper on black holes with Stephen Hawking. He argues that known laws of physics are inadequate to explain the phenomenon of consciousness. Penrose does not hold to any religious doctrine, and refers to himself as an atheist.

This mistaken idea (that referring to authorities is verboten), is ironically a reference from a poor authority, that has been referenced by unthinking, uncritical people with blind faith in that authority. In that form, it is a knowledge deterrent, a science stopper. The claim that referring to an authority is a fallacy, amounts to little short of dishonesty, in practice everyone refers to authorities. The real danger is in trusting an authority so much that we unquestioningly accept what they have propounded without question, and that is blind faith, which, in agreement with Boghossian, we should all be opposed to. The other danger of course is where we quote, or refer to an authority on an issue where the authority has no expertise, or is unqualified to comment on. Stephen Hawking is an indubitable authority in physics. But he is no philosopher. Metaphysics is not his area of expertise. Accordingly, when he said: “Philosophy is dead” he demonstrated the danger of using his mantle of scientific authority to propound something he has no qualifications in, to support that claim. This problem has been exacerbated in recent years due to specialization, where a person's particular field so encompasses all their energies, that they are in fact quite narrow in terms of overall knowledge. So,no problem with his reference to an expert on the size of missing doors.

Here, Boghossian underlines an important concept, the twin epistemic goals. Epistemology, is the study of how we come to know what we know. These, (twin goals) he rightly explains as the goals of increasing true knowledge and decreasing false beliefs:

“We want to maximize the number of true beliefs that we have...but if this was our only goal, then we could just believe everything we read, think, and hear...but...because we have a second goal, that we want to minimize the number of false beliefs that we have... But again, this doesn’t mean not believing anything, because that would mean we wouldn’t have any true beliefs.”

Another way of putting this is by imagining- that truth is to the mind- what food is to the body. By imagining that a radical skeptic might be thought of as a person who starves herself to death by rejecting all claims to truth, and conversely a gullible person is one who believes anything at all that is presented to her mind, and thus chokes to death trying to consume it all, or perhaps dies of obesity related diseases. To increase the likelihood of maximizing true beliefs, and minimizing false beliefs the reliability of the methods used must be taken into account. As referred to earlier, referring to authorities- is an integral and acceptable, even necessary part of the epistemic goal. An important part of the epistemological process, is involved in consciously evaluating the reliability of the authorities you choose to listen to.

“To do this we cannot use processes that are unreliable... Are there any commonalities among processes that take one away from reality?...Processes that decrease the likelihood that the conclusion one comes to will be true?...There are two.

The first, is that these processes are not based on evidence...

The second commonality, is that they’re based upon what one thinks is evidence- but is not actually evidence. I term such ostensibly benign superstitious beliefs, ‘gateway beliefs’. The Easter Bunny is an example of a conclusion, for which certain epistemic agents, certain people, think that there’s sufficient evidence….starting out with seemingly inconsequential beliefs for which one lacks sufficient evidence, may lay the framework, for one to cognitively habituate oneself, to lending one’s belief to other propositions or other things, which one also thinks that there’s sufficient evidence- when no such evidence exists. Now,we have finally set the groundwork to talk about faith. What is faith? ” Peter Boghossian

At this point I have no substantial disagreement, in fact Boghossian is doing me a favour, in that I have for some time suspected that many people, (and I see this among believers, and non believers), are holding beliefs that are not based on good grounds, or that are not warranted by the evidence they hold, or rather don’t hold. Boghossian is giving voice to my own loosely held suspicions that I have arrived at by observing a tendency among contemporary Christians to venerate, and propagate a form of faith that is unscriptural, and tends to keep people as perpetual children.

“Well, faith is belief without evidence, if one had evidence one wouldn’t need faith”

I have to interrupt Boghossian at this point, it seems that his definition of faith is common amongst atheists, but to take this as being indicative of reality is merely to feed a confirmation bias, or to accede to the availability heuristic. With the whole point of how wrong it is to give a strawman argument clearly in view, I must ask the reader, is it a sign of integrity to give one’s own definition of something that is not shared by the opposing view? Evidently this is a case of a violation of one of the most basic laws of thought. A violation at this level is, well I won’t say unforgivable, but at the very least, surprising. Boghossian has violated the law of identity. In his case “A is not A”. If I talk about Christian faith, the definition I would use is that which is accepted as standard, one which has a history of use by the Christian community. Or as close to it as I could possibly express.

I cannot speak for other belief systems, as I here, only speak on behalf of the one religion that he has lumped in with all the rest. Which brings me to my next point and that is the fallacy of hasty generalization. Or, to be more precise, a variation of that fallacy known as “the hasty conclusion”. He has made a bold assertion that faith is belief without evidence, but from what religions has he drawn this conclusion? Where is the supporting evidence of this? A bare assertion is not an acceptable statement without supporting evidence. I have no idea what his qualifications are with regard to religions, but astonishingly he has appeared to have made the assertion based on insufficient evidence- he appears then to be guilty of that which he is claiming is the problem among those who express faith! In fact he offers no evidence that his definition of faith is accurate across the broad spectrum of faiths. It may well be true that other faiths are guilty of believing things without proper warrant. This I cannot comment on, but to accuse Christianity of this is inaccurate. He is therefore at least guilty of using faith in a generic sense, which may well apply to other religions, but not to Christianity. It's an insult to intelligence to summarize the faith of all religions indiscriminately, and then compare that with the the beliefs of atheistic materialism. If you totaled up all the penalties awarded against every national rugby team of the world and then compared it to the number of penalties awarded against the All Blacks- would anyone in their right mind agree that it thereby demonstrates the All Blacks are the cleanest players of all? To do so is unbridled bigotry. Each must be taken on its own merits or there must be justification for that generality.

Clearly we have laid the groundwork already for fair and constructive ways to debate an issue, to arrive at truth. One of those crucial issues is the defining of terms. To put it another way, I don’t believe in the “faith” that Boghossian doesn’t believe in either! In fact, what Boghossian is describing is not faith, but fideism. What makes his argument particularly galling, is that Boghossian is attempting to ascribe to believers, and here I only speak for the Christian faith, he is, (in regard to our faith) ascribing to Christians something which he lays no claim to have experience of. Who is qualified to define faith? Someone who claims no experience of it? Isn’t that a little like someone from Sub-Saharan Africa proposing to define what it’s like to live in the Arctic Circle? Given, that faith- even as it is spoken of legitimately amongst Christians- has several meanings, which must always be understood by the context in which the word is used, it is not difficult to discern the sense in which we must use it for this exercise.

But to make matters clearer, let’s examine a definition of “fideism”, and see if it fits Boghassian’s view of “faith”. The exemplary Christian philosopher,

“Alvin Plantinga has noted that fideism can be defined as an ‘exclusive or basic reliance upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized especially in the pursuit of philosophical or religious truth’. Correspondingly, Plantinga writes, a fideist is someone who ‘urges reliance on faith rather than reason, in matters philosophical and religious” and who “may go on to disparage and denigrate reason”. Notice, first, that what the fideist seeks, according to this account, is truth. Fideism claims that truths of a certain kind can be grasped only by foregoing rational inquiry and relying solely on faith. ” (Alvin Plantinga as quoted from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”

To recap, we ask again, how Boghossian has described what he calls “faith”. This is his definition: “Well, faith is belief, without evidence, if one had evidence one wouldn’t need faith”. Clearly this comports well with Plantinga’s description of fideism. Fideism is faith or belief, that is confidence or trust- that what one believes is true- but it is confidence without reason. Others refer to it as “blind” faith. One only needs to ask then: How is supporting evidence arrived at? The broad answer, as discussed above, is by reason. So, fideism is belief without reason, fideism is belief without supporting evidence or reasons. Fideism is holding something to be true, without sufficient arguments for vindicating that belief. It is in fact the roof without supporting walls spoken of earlier. Fideism is to Christianity, what multiverses are to some scientists- without any reason, or evidence.

Apparently, his definition of faith (at least as it regards Christianity) has been confused with something else. So, having made clear that Boghossian has been describing faith as it should not be, it therefore seems only fitting to define it as it should be. As I am only speaking on behalf of Christianity, I will therefore propose to offer the Christian understanding or definition of faith. Now this may not be the faith of some who may pose as Christians, or it may not be the definition of some who are Christians may express, but it is an historic and well accepted definition.

“Faith is the substantiation of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen”

Clearly then this is not faith without evidence as defined authoritatively. Nor is it faith as it has been understood in practice for many centuries. It is my contention then, that Boghossian has- either by willing equivocation, or unwittingly- conflated fideism with faith. True, there is a relation, but the distinction is as important to Christians- as it may be vague to others.

Speaking only on behalf of Christianity, nowhere are people urged to believe in the tenets of the Christian belief system without adequate reason. Saint Paul is an authoritative source with regards to the orthodox doctrine of the Christian texts. Saint Luke, records an instance in the life of Paul where he criticizes people of other belief systems for their lack of evidence to support their belief in that which they purport to worship. He lambasts the early Greeks of Athens, on Mars hill, for fideism or belief without evidence:

“I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, “TO THE UNKNOWN GOD”. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship…”Acts 17:22-31

Synonyms for the word “superstitious” relate to beliefs that are: groundless, or unfounded, irrational, illusory or mythical.

There is also another point that needs to be raised in all of this. The word “faith” is most often associated with religion, and because its true meaning, at least with regard to Christianity, has been conscientiously denied to the Christian faith by people with an ideological axe to grind, it is therefore commonly used in a pejorative sense. Occasionally one might hear it used in conjunction to other disciplines such as science.

Here is one such example where it is used in an acceptable way, one in which it’s true sense is apparent:

'Paul Davis, a brilliant physicist at ASU says "that the right scientific attitude" now listen to this, Paul Davis is not a theist- "the right scientific attitude is essentially theological, science can only proceed if the scientist adopts an essentially theological worldview, even the most atheistic scientist accepts as an act of faith the existence of a law-like order in nature that is, at least in part, comprehensible to us." Einstein said " I cannot imagine the scientist without that profound faith"- note the word" ‘ John Lennox

When a “scientist accepts as an act of faith the existence of a law-like order in nature” what is she in effect doing? Here is a similar account by C.S. Lewis:

“Men became scientific because they expected Law in Nature, and they expected Law in Nature because they believed in a Legislator. In most modern scientists this belief has died…”

What has died? And what remains? Among many scientists, belief in a supreme legislator has died. The faith or belief in a supreme being that legislated the order in nature has in the hallowed halls of science and academia, largely passed away, but what remains is a belief or faith in the law-like order in nature by which they expect that their investigations into nature will reward their efforts. That wasn’t, for the most part, how it was for the early empiricists.

But let’s change the language somewhat. “Faith” and “belief” are such religious terms aren’t they? The modern concept of science has chalked up such numerous successes that the momentum of its success has carried it beyond the confines of its earlier progenitors. As Lewis pointed out, faith in God prompted a faith in nature, because of a principle of correspondence. The God of scripture, was also the author of nature therefore, they inferred- that just as we understand many things by scripture- so too will we gain knowledge from examining the other “book” he wrote. What Einstein called “the eternal mystery of the Universe”, its intelligibility, was something he couldn’t account for, therefore in his mind it was a puzzle. The accessibility to human endeavour and reason, the fact that a characteristic of the whole Universe may be encapsulated in an elegant formula only an inch long, with just a few characters, was, to Einstein’s prodigious mind- a matter of deep wonder. Why? Because a materialistic worldview, the view that nature is all there is, cannot give a credible answer to that issue. The laws governing the Universe are still confidently assumed, but the reason they were originally inferred has been lost. Einstein like many others had inherited the attitude of expectation, driven by the impetus of its own success, but without the divine explanation.

All of this points to the reality that scientists are exercising faith in the law-like order of nature without rational grounds which supports that confidence. They are, in short fideists. Ah, but we know that isn’t true is it? No, and why not? Because the ongoing and continued success of science in explaining reality- is now the ground upon, and for which the contemporary scientist continues to rest his confidence. But as others have cogently argued, the scientific endeavour might never have got off the ground if it had not been for the existence of the general conditions of faith in God infused in the culture in which science was nurtured. To follow the historical relation of science and religion, see Alister E. McGrath, Science & Religion: An Introduction.

But I promised that we would depart from these religious terms such as faith and belief didn’t I? If you review the previous two paragraphs, as you do so, ask the question: Did those paragraphs make sense? Note that I am not asking if what I said was true, you will no doubt have your own view on that, but what I do ask is that you acknowledge that you had no difficulty in understanding what it was that I was saying- that it was legible, and followed accepted conventions of grammar and semiotics. My point is that words such as having faith and belief, as it regards our subject, may be exchanged quite happily with words or phrases such as “inferred”, “confidently assumed”, “attitude of expectation”. Suddenly the words largely associated with religion, have been replaced with synonymous terms, but without the religious connotation, without the stigma.

While “inference to the best explanation” is an acceptable term in philosophy, it is also accepted as a non-deductive logical argument in science. In fact every reference to the laws of nature is one that has a non-deductive implication. And this is not merely an opinion, this is accepted by even atheist or skeptic philosophers of science such as David Hume, and Bertrand Russell. Both highly respected, and renown for their influence in philosophy and logic. How much science can be done without reference to the laws of nature? In short, if my definition of faith with regard to the Christian religion is correct, in that it infers the existence of God from evidence, or it infers belief in miracles from reliable sources, then Christians are doing no more that what is required of science. Ironically it was Charles Darwin who explored and popularized the acceptance of inference to the best explanation among the scientific community with his work on the “Origin Of Species”

To summarize then:

Peter Boghossian with regard to the philosophers obligation to provide an honest “best case” of that which he opposes has not been observed.

He failed to correctly define terms that were integral to the disagreement.

He engaged in some rhetorical tactics, appealing to prejudice.

In providing a generic definition of faith he failed in regard to Christianity. His definition may well apply to some, or all other faiths. But not to Christianity and is therefore guilty of hasty generalization.

If his argument succeeded against Christianity, then it succeeds against science and philosophy as well since logical inference is used and accepted by all.

He failed to show how Christian ways of knowing are unreliable, the three examples he uses of belief without evidence were pseudoscientific that have nothing whatsoever to do with Christian faith which, from the title given to his argument is the main target of his skepticism.